Verify a supplier bank account change before paying

Treat the change as a separate decision

An approved supplier and an approved purchase order do not establish that a newly requested bank account is legitimate. The FBI describes business email compromise as a scheme that can use spoofed addresses or compromised accounts to redirect payments. A convincing message may arrive inside a real business conversation.

Keep the purchasing decision separate from the payment change. Preserve the request and the previously approved instructions. Tell finance which invoice or deposit is affected, and leave the change unapproved while it is checked. Urgency is a reason to escalate the review, not skip it.

Confirm through a trusted, independent channel

Call a supplier contact using a number already held in your approved records, not a number supplied in the change request or its signature. The FBI recommends independently verifying changes to account numbers or payment procedures. Simply replying to the same email does not provide that independent check.

Ask the known contact to confirm that the change was authorized, identify the proposed beneficiary and explain any change in the receiving entity. Record who was reached and how the contact number was obtained. Route inconsistencies to your finance team; a callback is one control, not a guarantee that a transfer is safe.

Keep a short payment-change record

This is a RivetBridge working checklist, not a bank verification standard. Adapt the approval roles to your organization and keep sensitive banking information in your controlled finance system.

• Identify the supplier, invoice or purchase order, revision and affected payment.
• Compare the previously approved and proposed beneficiary names, countries and account references; flag every difference.
• Record the independent contact, the origin of the contact details, the confirmation date and unresolved questions.
• Attach the request and supporting evidence without overwriting the old approved instructions.
• Name the authorized finance reviewer and record approval, rejection or a continued hold before changing the payment record.

Illustrative example: an enclosure deposit

A supplier sends revised deposit instructions for an enclosure order. The part revision and price are unchanged, but the beneficiary is now a different company. Purchasing records the discrepancy and calls the established supplier contact using an existing approved number.

Until finance accepts the explanation and required evidence, the changed payment remains on hold. “The supplier replied” is not the same status as “finance approved.” This fictional example illustrates a review gap; it does not establish that a different beneficiary is fraudulent.

If money has already been sent

If you suspect a fraudulent transfer, contact your financial institution immediately. The FBI and IC3 advise prompt bank contact and reporting to IC3. Follow the bank’s recovery instructions and preserve the correspondence and transaction records. Recovery is not guaranteed; do not wait for a procurement review before contacting the bank.